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Summary 
This thesis seeks to examine the interplay of the theory of equal sovereignty 
between states and justiciability of human rights, in particular the right to 
health, as enshrined in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 
 
The essay contains an overview of the theory of sovereignty, divided into its 
two main paradigms of thought, namely universalism and particularism. 
This to provide a foundation for further discussion on the impact of theories 
on sovereignty on justiciability and enforcement of human rights. They are 
intertwined because of the assertion of universality of human rights - 
meaning that they are applicable to every human on earth, no matter what 
jurisdiction he or she resides in - collides in quite a considerable way with 
the principle of equal sovereignty. This, since a sovereign state is contended 
to have the right to govern its domestic affairs without interference of the 
international community. 
 
By accounting for the history of theory on sovereignty and global order, as 
well as integrating two modern theories on the same subject, the legal 
framework of the ICESCR is questioned, in relation to its application of 
state sovereignty. Modern universalist theories on sovereignty forces us to 
question whether it is possible to maintain that state consent is necessary for 
declaring individual communications (regulated in the optional protocol to 
the ICESCR) admissible before the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. This because, by some academics, human rights of a socio-
economic nature are argued to be constitutive of sovereign authority, hence 
the formerly full autonomy practiced by a state declared sovereign is not 
accepted as legally justifiable any longer by all. A proportionate 
intervention in relation to a violation of the ICESCR should be the 
justiciability intervention, which enables the ECOSOC and the Committee 
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on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to effectively monitor the 
implementation of the Covenant. 
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Sammanfattning 
Denna uppsats syftar till att undersöka samspelet mellan principen om 
jämbördig suveränitet stater emellan och möjligheterna för rättslig prövning 
och verkställighet av mänskliga rättigheter. I synnerhet undersöks rätten till 
hälsa, såsom den redogörs för i International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights.  
 
Uppsatsen innehåller en sammanfattning av suveränitetsteorin och dess 
klassiska uppdelning i universalism och partikularism. Denna redogörelse 
anses nödvändig för att kunna fortsätta diskutera den inverkan som 
suveränitetsteorin haft på möjligheterna för rättslig prövning och 
verkställighet av mänskliga rättigheter. Dessa koncept är sammanflätade på 
grund av uppfattningen att universaliteten av mänskliga rättigheter, det vill 
säga att de är gällande i förhållande till alla människor på denna jord oavsett 
vilken jurisdiktion de befinner sig i, kolliderar med principen om jämbördig 
statlig suveränitet. Detta eftersom att en suverän stat påstås ha rätten att 
handha sina inhemska förehavanden utan inblandning av det internationella 
samfundet. 
 
Genom att redogöra för suveränitetsteorins historia och försök till global 
organisering av tidigare inomstatliga förehavanden, samt inkluderandet av 
två moderna teorier i samma fåra, så ifrågasätts det legala ramverket kring 
ICESCR, i relation till dess uppfattning av statlig suveränitet. Modern 
suveränitetsteori av den universella skolan tvingar oss att ställa frågan 
huruvida det är möjligt att uppehålla kravet på statligt samtycke för att en 
individuell kommunikation (reglerad i optional protocol till ICESCR) ska 
förklaras giltig av kommittén för ekonomiska, sociala och kulturella 
rättigheter. Detta på grund av att mänskliga rättigheter numera, av vissa 
akademiker, argumenteras vara konstitutiva i förhållande till suveränitet. 
Således är det ursprungliga antagandet att fullständig autonomi åtnjuts av en 
påstådd suverän stat inte längre juridiskt hållbart till fullo. Ett proportionellt 
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ingripande när en rättighet i ICESCR möjligen är kränkt, borde vara 
’ingripande till förmån för rättslig prövning’, vilket möjliggör för ECOSOC 
och kommittén för ekonomiska, sociala och kulturella mänskliga rättigheter 
att på ett effektivt sätt övervaka implementeringen av ICESCR.  
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Abbreviations  
ECOSOC   Economic and Social Council 
 
ICESCR International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights  
 
IGO International Governmental 
Organisation 
 
IILJ Institute for International Law and 
Justice 
 
UN The United Nations 
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1 Introduction  
After studying international law from different perspectives in my elective 
courses, at the end of my masters degree of law at the University of Lund, 
there was a concept that still had not found a place to rest within me: the 
concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty is often dealt with as a matter of fact, 
objectively, a legal concept just like anything else one might encounter 
when studying law. It is a prerequisite for international law because of the 
classic assumption regarding the nation-state being the main actor in 
international law and as the sovereign authority it is free to do as it wishes 
within its jurisdiction.1 However, regardless of this, sovereignty is very 
difficult to define in its ever-changing nature and even more so in the 
globalised world we live in today.  
 
The hypothesis that began to formulate within me, was that international 
lawyers are not capable of defining sovereignty – and other academic 
disciplines dealing with sovereignty, such as international relations, might 
not be better equipped for the task either – because sovereignty is not a 
matter of fact. It is not possible to dissect sovereignty into its empirical 
building blocks, just as less as one can dissect a human being and detect 
everything that makes us human. It is logical really; international law has 
been keen to view the state as an individual and when dissecting the 
“physical” state as such, one might be able to understand why a state looks 
like a state, but not why and how it should act in every given situation, 
which is of course the same for a human being.3  
 
Sovereignty, in itself, is an interesting academic debate, but usually heavily 
theoretical. It struck me as interesting to think more on sovereignty in 
                                                
1 Case of S.S. Lotus, Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Series A. 
– No. 10, September 7th, 1927, Collection of Judgements, p. 18: ”[…] the first and 
foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that […] it may not 
exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State.”  
3 IILJ Working Paper 2008/3 (History and Theory of International Law Series) Finalized 
7/2/2008 (www.iilj.org), p. 28.7/2/2008 (www.iilj.org), p. 35. 
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relation to justiciability and enforcement mechanisms in international law 
(with a focus of socio-economic human rights). This because the principle 
of equal sovereignty always seems to show up as an obstacle for the 
efficiency of international law.  It is understood by the international 
community that in order to effectively deal with problems of a global nature, 
trans-state relations are needed. My own understanding of international law 
though, is that political will is always stronger than arguments based on 
international law, because of the trump card held by nation-states – namely 
the principle of equal sovereignty. Also, one must consider that the power of 
the trump card gets is relative to the power of the state in question.  
 
So, in order to truly evaluate justiciability and enforcement mechanisms, 
chapter 2 gives a thorough understanding of the two paradigms in 
sovereignist theory: particularism and universalism. This to serve as a 
fundament for further discussion on justiciability in chapter 3 and 4. This 
thesis will take aim at socio-economic human rights and the scope of the 
essay will therefor be to evaluate the universalist aspirations of socio-
economic human rights, but critically forcing sovereignist theory into the 
debate, to paint a fuller picture of justiciability of socio-economic human 
rights. The question boils down to whether state consent is necessary for the 
admissibility of individual communications to ECOSOC when respect for 
human rights are argued to be constitutive of sovereignty itself? 
 
The socio-economic rights will be narrowed down to the right to health in 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. It will 
serve as an example for discussing the relativity of socio-economic rights 
and the problems that it causes in relation to justiciability.  
 
1.1 Literature and method 
The purpose of this thesis is to effectively integrate modern theory regarding 
sovereignty, into the debate on justiciability of socio-economic human 
rights. In order to accomplish that, a thorough account of sovereign theory is 
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needed, both historically and modern perspectives, to lay the groundwork 
for further discussion on the linkage between sovereignty and justiciability 
of socio-economic human rights.  
 
Chapter 2, ‘Sovereignty in theory’, 2.1.2 – 2.1.4 describes the great divide 
of international law, the one between universalism and particularism, using 
mainly one source of information: the New York University School of 
Law’s Institute for International Law and Justice Working Paper, written by 
Armin von Bogdandy and Sergio Dellavalle, named ‘Universalism and 
Particularism as Paradigms of International Law’. The paper provided for a 
main part of the information needed for chapter two, since the main purpose 
of the IILJ working paper is to in brief present the debate of international 
law over time as unbiased as possible, not including personal opinions until 
the very end of the paper, in chapter five. In other words, it is not a 
publication written with a goal of arguing for a certain cause, rather to give 
account of the history of international law without picking sides. Although 
history obviously can be subjected to distortion in preference for a certain 
opinion, I deem the quality of the information in the IILJ working paper to 
be well up to standard for the purpose of my thesis. The vast number of 
sources in the IILJ working paper is also important to consider, because it 
helps to guarantee the scientific value of my thesis, since the IILJ working 
paper is the primary source for my account of universalism and 
particularism. For this reason, I found it of lesser importance than in many 
other situations to collect alternative sources to protect chapter two from 
suffering from unbalanced information. I believe that the decision is 
strengthened by the validity and expected quality of the source, since New 
York University School of Law’s Institute for International Law and Justice 
is associated with renowned experts in the field of international law.7  
 
In chapter 2.2 the objective is the opposite. The theory of the New 
Sovereigntists from International Studies Quarterly and the Disaggregated 
State from Anne-Marie Slaughter’s book ‘A New World Order’ was chosen 
                                                
7 See http://www.iilj.org/aboutus/faculty_committees.asp, 2013-07-19, 10:49. 
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to articulate the differences between particularist, respectively universalist 
thought in the most obvious way possible. By adding this section, I wanted 
to open up for the possibility to discuss a global order already operating (the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, more 
information on that below), in direct relation to two theoretical views on 
global order, which are each other opposites.  
 
The main purpose of chapter 3, ‘the Right to Health – a Human Right 
Worthy of Universal Jurisdiction’, is to provide for basic understanding of 
the ICESCR, with a focus on the country reporting system and individual 
communications. To put it differently, the work of ECOSOC and the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The main source of 
information is therefore the Covenant itself and publications from U.N. 
organs connected to the Covenant. 
 
To sum up, the thesis is relying on academic publications on theories 
regarding sovereignty and global order and to some extent international law 
substantiated by the ICESCR and ‘soft law’ connected to the Covenant. The 
material is used to provide an understanding of the chasm dividing 
international legal theory in the debate on sovereignty and global order, to 
enable a discussion on what modern sovereign theory might provide for in 
strengthening justiciability and enforcement of socio-economic rights, 
mainly the right to health (ICESCR article 12). That analysis is dealt with in 
chapter 4. 
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2 Sovereignty in theory 
2.1 Terminology  
This chapter serves to give an understanding of the terminology used when 
sovereignty is discussed, both in history and in modern times. 
2.1.1 Particularism 
In order to grasp a particularist view on global order and specify sovereignty 
with a certain definition within particularism, there are two pillars on which 
this theory rests (along with the different sub-categories belonging to 
particularism as well): 
 
1. “order [is] possible only within the particular polity”.8 
2. “a polity is only viable if particular”.9 
 
So, in a particularist view the world comprises of many different polities, 
made particular by its members, their shared “experience” of some sort, 
exclusive for that particular polity.10 The second pillar tells us that if this 
particularity is not found, then it is not a particular polity. The first pillar is 
quite self-evident, but it might need clarification in as much as it cannot 
extend to the whole of human kind.11 That would be a universalist line of 
thought, which will be dealt with further on in the essay.  
 
A world made up by particular polities, paint the picture of a conflicting co-
existence between a large numbers of islands of self-interest. It is important 
though to distinguish that the particularist in general takes a holistic view on 
                                                
8 IILJ Working Paper 2008/3 (History and Theory of International Law Series) Finalized 
7/2/2008 (www.iilj.org), p. 28. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 IILJ Working Paper 2008/3 (History and Theory of International Law Series) Finalized 
9 Ibid. 
0
1
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the polity’s interest.12 The individual takes a step back in particularist theory 
to the advantage of the state.  
 
We now turn to three sub-categories developed under the particularist 
paradigm, namely realism, nationalism and hegemonism. 
 
 
2.1.1.1 Realism 
Particularist realism boils down to the belief that “politics is nothing but 
struggle for power”13. The realistic approach has been discussed for many 
years, starting with Thucydides (460-400 b. Chr), picked up by Machiavelli 
(1469-1527) and in modern times elaborated on by Hans J. Morgenthau.14  
 
The contention that all politics is a struggle for power is a graspable theory 
in external politics, since the international arena is considerably more 
lawless than the national arena, but realists have always struggled with 
dissecting internal politics by the same formula.15 Applying the same 
politics/struggle-assertion to nation-states, which in general are governed by 
the rule of law to a much greater extent than the international community, 
the realists struggle to hold the theory together.16  
 
This in-built problem of realism resulted in the development of “structural 
realism” or “neo-realism”, which limited its focus to the international arena 
and quite creatively erased the problem of classical realism.17 Morgenthau 
was one of the founders of neo-realism and through his contribution to the 
                                                
12 Ibid. 
13 IILJ Working Paper 2008/3 (History and Theory of International Law Series) Finalized 
7/2/2008 (www.iilj.org), p. 29. 
14 IILJ Working Paper 2008/3 (History and Theory of International Law Series) Finalized 
7/2/2008 (www.iilj.org), p. 29-30. 
15 IILJ Working Paper 2008/3 (History and Theory of International Law Series) Finalized 
7/2/2008 (www.iilj.org), p. 29. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Slaughter, supra note 5, at 30 as cited in IILJ Working Paper 2008/3 (History and Theory 
of International Law Series) Finalized 7/2/2008 (www.iilj.org), p. 29-30. 
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debate, the domestic arena was left out and neo-realism focused exclusively 
on the most hostile state relations and their organisation of the same.18  
 
 
2.1.1.2 Nationalism 
Nationalism provides a clear answer to the particularity of a polity that 
particularism depends on. A particular history, destiny, culture or ethos links 
the individuals together to the extent needed for a particular polity in a 
particularist sense.19  The realists’ problem with explaining differences 
between external and internal policies, find a probable solution in the 
nationalist theory, where the particular factor holding the state together, 
allows for the rule of law to prevail in the domestic arena, but not in the 
global.20  
 
Nationalism is centred on the self-sufficient state and the theory as such 
“justifies the quest for solidarity and inclusion inside as well as collision and 
exclusion outside”.21 This might have worked in theory before globalization 
started, but in modern times when states are ever more linked to each other, 
nationalism as a particularist theory is more difficult to uphold.22 This 
insight paved the way for hegemonism.23 
 
 
2.1.1.3 Hegemonism 
Based on the idea that some states enjoy a more powerful position than 
others, the idea of the hegemon in international relations and international 
law emerged. Carl Schmitt put forward a theory in the 1930s, the so-called 
“large-range-order” (Großraumordnung). The theory took as its starting 
                                                
18 IILJ Working Paper 2008/3 (History and Theory of International Law Series) Finalized 
7/2/2008 (www.iilj.org), p. 30. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 IILJ Working Paper 2008/3 (History and Theory of International Law Series) Finalized 
7/2/2008 (www.iilj.org), p. 31. 
23 Ibid. 
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point the challenges of the European nation-states at that time and proposed 
that in order to effectively deal with the same challenges, a global order 
should be based on a few great states.24 The hegemon, i.e. one of the great 
states, should have the possibility and resources to bring order to a greater 
extent than merely within the borders of that state according to the theory of 
“large-range-order”.25  
 
The world would then comprise of several different “large-range-order” 
hegemons and between these the principle of non-intervention would 
apply.26 The particular polity of the “large-range-order-State” would be 
defined, according to Schmitt, as an “ethnically and ideologically 
homogenous group”, but in his hegemonic interpretation of the particularist-
holistic paradigm, the particular polity could extend beyond the nation-state, 
due to a wider margin incorporated into the definition of the particularity.27  
 
Although hegemonism in theory presents a global order, it is important to 
remember that it is not universal and in Schmitt’s mind “[n]o universal law 
or order is recognized […] to be more than a mere deceit.28  
 
 As is pointed out by Armin von Bogdandy and Sergio Dellavalle in their 
IILJ working paper: “[a]mong the variants of the particularist-holistic 
paradigm, hegemonism appears to be most in tune with the challenges of 
globalisation […]”29. For that reason a brief summary of their presentation 
on US-American neoconservative movement (further on: neocons) will be 
included here, since it is a good example of modern hegemonism. 
 
So in what way have the neocons brought something new to the table? Two 
aspects on the neocons vision of global order should be mentioned:  
                                                
24 Ibid. 
25 IILJ Working Paper 2008/3 (History and Theory of International Law Series) Finalized 
7/2/2008 (www.iilj.org), p. 31. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
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1. neocons have no theoretical boundary on the hegemons usage of 
power, 
2. the democratic principle is the axis of the theory, which is used to 
justify intervention in non-democratic states to install the hegemons 
interest and it also provides as the main argument for scepticism of 
international law.30  
 
These fundamental principles of the hegemonistic theory of the neocons 
leads to a few interesting arguments put forward by Jeremy A. Rabkin.31 
Bogdandy’s and Dellavalle’s description of his attitude towards 
international law is telling: “[i]n Rabkin’s view, international law is an 
instrument for restraining the well-motivated and legitimate national 
interests of the United States, as the paladin of the free world, and of all 
other liberal and democratic nation-states”.32 The principle of sovereign 
nation-states is held high and some of the neocons deny international 
institutions any legal effect at all.33 The structure of international 
institutions, they argue, which invite non-democratic states in the decision-
making procedure, is an obstacle for the battle of the liberal hegemon to 
effectively defend its ideology.34  
 
What is interesting with the neocons is that with its most extreme advocates, 
the subordination of the neocons under the particularist theories becomes 
questionable. The first criteria of particularism are dislodged; the particular 
polity is hard to define and it is explained in the following section. 
 
Deepak Lal removes the theoretical boundaries of hegemony completely 
and insists on the possibility of the United States hegemonic order becoming 
                                                
30 IILJ Working Paper 2008/3 (History and Theory of International Law Series) Finalized 
7/2/2008 (www.iilj.org), p. 32 and 35. 
31 IILJ Working Paper 2008/3 (History and Theory of International Law Series) Finalized 
7/2/2008 (www.iilj.org), p. 32. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
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global.35 However, Lal does not contend that a universality of values (such 
as fundamental human rights) is constitutive of the hegemonic order of the 
United States.36 There are neocons that interestingly enough do propose 
such a universality of values. Robert Kagan argues that liberty is a principle 
shared universally by all human beings.37 With those basic assumptions 
comes the right, according to Kagan, to intervene in domestic affairs 
formerly protected by the principle of equal sovereignty, if the intervention 
serves to protect a fundamental right, such as freedom.38 With Kagan’s 
contribution to the neoconservative line of thought, hegemony is arguably a 
particularist theory, but with a universal aim, based on the assumption of 
universal values shared by all humans.39 This makes the particularity, not so 
particular anymore.  
 
 
2.1.2 Universalism 
Leaving the particularistic paradigm, which only give credits to theories of 
international law where the ambition is not universal, focus now shift to 
universalism. A paradigm based on the assumption that all human beings 
share a set of values and upon these values a universally binding 
international law can be built.40  
 
Much like with particularism, it is possible to explain the gist of 
universalism by dividing the theory in its two sub-categories: the 
metaphysical tradition and contract theory.41 
 
 
                                                
35 IILJ Working Paper 2008/3 (History and Theory of International Law Series) Finalized 
7/2/2008 (www.iilj.org), p. 36. 
36 Ibid. 
37 IILJ Working Paper 2008/3 (History and Theory of International Law Series) Finalized 
7/2/2008 (www.iilj.org), p. 37. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 IILJ Working Paper 2008/3 (History and Theory of International Law Series) Finalized 
7/2/2008 (www.iilj.org), p. 37-38. 
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2.1.2.1 The metaphysical tradition 
The metaphysical tradition dates further back than contract theory, which is 
why it is dealt with first.42 Before Christianity became a factor in Western 
philosophical thought, the universal laws that arguably existed, were the 
laws of nature.43 The philosophical conviction that the laws of nature were 
universal and divided from the laws of human were developed in ancient 
Greece and Rome.44 The laws of humans were at this time still thought to be 
specific for every different polity.45 Stoicism introduced universality of the 
laws of humans later on, with the interesting addition that in order to have 
legally valid law in a specific polity, it had to be in accordance with the 
universal law, which in theory were hierarchically placed above internal 
laws of polities.46  
 
However, it was with the birth of Christianity that a true universalist thought 
began to formulate.47 The universality of the Stoics never reached more than 
theoretical interest, but the strong connection Christianity in short time 
developed with the political and legal dimensions of societies, forced the 
universalist thought to be materialized since Christianity was based on the 
idea of a community encompassing all humans.48 
 
Firstly, this inspired the idea of a universal monarchy, which proved to be 
impossible in reality because of Christianity – despite its ambitious 
campaigning – actually was not the religion of choice all over the world.49 
The idea of a universal monarchy evolved into jus inters gentes, which is to 
be understood as international law based on shared principles, derived from 
                                                
42 IILJ Working Paper 2008/3 (History and Theory of International Law Series) Finalized 
7/2/2008 (www.iilj.org), p. 37. 
43 IILJ Working Paper 2008/3 (History and Theory of International Law Series) Finalized 
7/2/2008 (www.iilj.org), p. 38. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 IILJ Working Paper 2008/3 (History and Theory of International Law Series) Finalized 
7/2/2008 (www.iilj.org), p. 38-39. 
49 IILJ Working Paper 2008/3 (History and Theory of International Law Series) Finalized 
7/2/2008 (www.iilj.org), p. 39. 
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Christianity.50 However, it became evident that the direct linkage to 
Christianity and international law, would not truly be international as long 
as the linkage persisted, because as mentioned earlier not that many people 
are in fact Christians.51 The linkage was broken with the theories developed 
by Hugo Grotius, who placed the universality in the very nature of 
humans.52 As Bogdandy and Dellavalle put it when describing Grotius’ 
contribution to universality: “[…] international law can be seen as the 
common law of humankind […]”.53 The theories of Grotius also serve as a 
fundament of the modern theory of the international community.54 
 
Last, but not least, some light must be shed on the biggest flaw of the 
universalist approach under the metaphysical sub-category, namely the fact 
that a global community with universal principles shared by all human 
beings is harder to prove, than it is to dream of.55 This is of course a big 
problem for these theories, since its core assumption is not yet proved to be 
true.56  
 
 
2.1.2.2 Contract theory 
Thomas Hobbes introduced contract theory, in which he reversed the prior 
assertion that the society was superior to the individuals living within it and 
placed the individual in centre as the bearer of fundamental rights and 
acknowledged the individual as owner of the right to give legitimacy of 
authority.57 This is what gave name to theory, namely the contract between 
the individual and the state, enabling for the latter to take on the duty of 
                                                
50 Ibid. 
51 IILJ Working Paper 2008/3 (History and Theory of International Law Series) Finalized 
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52 IILJ Working Paper 2008/3 (History and Theory of International Law Series) Finalized 
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guaranteeing a better life for the individual and her fellow citizens.58 
Contractualism was later developed by Immanuel Kant, into a theory with 
universalist aspirations.59  
 
 
2.1.3 Democratic legitimacy 
2.1.3.1 Globalisation and public international law 
The world is getting more globalised than it ever has been before and 
globalisation is not easy to define, the concept includes a range of factors. 
For international law and especially for sovereignty, it suffices, for the 
scope of this essay, to say that the core meaning of globalisation is that the 
traditional nation-state has been transformed into something much less 
undefined.60 When globalisation partly erases the boundaries within which 
sovereignty and democratic legitimacy has found a workable balance, this 
creates a problem.61 It is argued that it might create a deficit of popular 
sovereignty62 in the arena of international law, which will be explained in 
the forthcoming sections. 
 
Traditionally, there are several factors, on which the academic community 
have to a large extent agreed upon, which is demanded of a state in order to 
be considered democratic.64 Governing institutions must derive their power 
from general, free, equal and periodic elections in which the citizens have 
the right to vote.65 Furthermore, the rule of law needs to be respected and 
the range of the same has to be controlled with a guaranteed possibility of 
                                                
58 IILJ Working Paper 2008/3 (History and Theory of International Law Series) Finalized 
7/2/2008 (www.iilj.org), p. 41-42. 
59 IILJ Working Paper 2008/3 (History and Theory of International Law Series) Finalized 
7/2/2008 (www.iilj.org), p. 42. 
60 IILJ Working Paper 2008/3 (History and Theory of International Law Series) Finalized 
7/2/2008 (www.iilj.org), p. 12. 
61 Ibid. 
62 ”Under a democratic constitution, popular sovereignty is nothing but the realisation of 
democracy on which the legitimacy of all public power rests”, IILJ Working Paper 2008/3 
(History and Theory of International Law Series) Finalized 7/2/2008 (www.iilj.org), p. 12. 
64 IILJ Working Paper 2008/3 (History and Theory of International Law Series) Finalized 
7/2/2008 (www.iilj.org), p. 14. 
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replacing the government.66 In a globalised world where a large portion of 
the legally binding decision that are being taken, emanate from outside the 
nation-state, the necessary criteria demanded by classic democratic theories, 
evolved in relation to a internationally detached sovereign state, are hard to 
maintain.67  
 
The scope of this essay does not include democratic theory as such, but I 
will allow myself a minor exception, explaining the debate on who is the 
primary subject of democracy and what is democracy’s main purpose.  
 
With regard to the subject of democracy, particularists often argue that 
theoretical considerations on democracy should define the people as a 
macro-subject, which is called the holistic-concept of democracy.68 
Universalists on the other hand, usually considers democratic theory to 
emanate from the individual and this view is called individual, civil or 
fundamental rights concepts of democracy.69 The purpose of democracy is 
also debated and this discussion concerns whether democracy is about self-
determination or whether democracy’s primary task is to maintain control 
over the government, in whatever form it might exist.70 The former opinion 
is called the emphatic or emancipatory conception of democracy, the latter 
the sceptical understanding of democracy.71  
 
These above mentioned different points of references are necessary to have 
in mind when discussing democratic legitimacy, since depending on what 
fundamental values are put into the term democracy, the process of granting 
legitimacy might differ. 
 
                                                
66 IILJ Working Paper 2008/3 (History and Theory of International Law Series) Finalized 
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To sum up, globalisation is putting pressure on the prior definition of what 
was to be considered a legitimate democratic decision and international law 
is slipping further away from national parliaments, increasing the public 
nature of international law.72  
 
  
2.1.3.2 In-put/out-put legitimacy 
What has been discussed in the previous section on democratic legitimacy is 
also defined as in-put legitimacy.73 It is, in other words, legitimacy that 
derives from whatever theory on what is considered democratic as such. If 
the decision has been taken in accordance with democratic principles, 
whatever they may be, it is to be considered legitimate. 
 
There is however a completely converse theory called out-put legitimacy.74 
This theory obviously considers the out-put of a decision as the most 
important factor.75 If public international law effectively protects common 
interests, the out-put is motivating the decision to be considered legitimate, 
rather than depending on formal procedure, which is the case of in-put 
legitimacy.76 
 
2.1.3.3 Globalisation: the particularist vs. the 
universalist 
In the previous sections the issue of globalisation has been dealt with in 
short, as have different theories on legitimacy. The two next sections will 
organize these different views of legitimacy into the two categories 
particularism and universalism.  
                                                
72 Bogdandy and Dellavalle define public as: “[…] international law consists of 
increasingly more norms which bind a state irrespective of its consent”, IILJ Working 
Paper 2008/3 (History and Theory of International Law Series) Finalized 7/2/2008 
(www.iilj.org), p. 9. 
73 IILJ Working Paper 2008/3 (History and Theory of International Law Series) Finalized 
7/2/2008 (www.iilj.org), p. 14. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
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2.1.3.3.1 Particularism: sovereign equality, informality and 
unilaterism 
Particularist theories, generally speaking, do not try to find a way to deal 
with globalisation as it spreads, they rather try to slow it down or even stop 
it.77 In its most radical form, particularism suggests a complete safeguarding 
of the principle of sovereign equality and simply advocates co-ordination 
between states.78 This is based on the particularist assumption that 
democracy is only possible within a nation-state, i.e. a particular polity.79  
 
There are however particularist thoughts on allowing co-operation between 
states (co-operation is terminologically stronger than co-ordination), but still 
downplaying the role of international law.80 International relations should be 
guided by the principle of informality, rather than organized under a legal 
framework.81 The idea is that if nothing is bestowed with binding qualities 
under international law, the national decision-making process is still in 
control and consequently the principle of democratic self-determination is 
respected.82  
 
A third particularist theory on responding to globalisation is unilaterism.83 
The state should act unilaterally in order to use globalisation to serve its 
own interests as much as possible.84  
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2.1.3.3.2 Universalism: cosmopolitan law and state-
centred integration 
The most radical universalist proposition would be that of the cosmopolitan 
democracy, which is a federalist idea placing the former equally sovereign 
nation-states into a grander scheme where a supranational democratic 
instance is the venue for the creation of public international law.85 A 
democratic world federation in other words.86  
 
Climbing a step down on the ladder of radicalism, there is the universalism 
idea of state-centred integration; a theory focusing on co-operation rather 
than full integration.87 The nation-state should persist and close co-operation 
amongst nation-states is deemed satisfactory for meeting the challenges of 
globalisation, but still respecting the democratic principles, which are 
acknowledged to be best realized within the borders of a sovereign state.88 
The main argument in preference for state-centred integration over the 
cosmopolitan democracy, is the fear for setting up a framework in which 
despotism can grow to reach the entire world.89 
 
State-centred integration can be divided into two sub-categories: the 
unitarian model of legitimation and the pluralist model of legitimation.90  
 
In the unitarian model the democratic principle is asserted to be protected if 
decisions are being made: “only through the choices of the electorate”.91 
This can be done in a direct manner through referenda where the complete 
citizenry has taken part in the decision or if the decision has been taken by 
elected bodies (as Bogdandy and Belleville describes the phenomena: 
                                                
85 IILJ Working Paper 2008/3 (History and Theory of International Law Series) Finalized 
7/2/2008 (www.iilj.org), p. 22-23. 
86 IILJ Working Paper 2008/3 (History and Theory of International Law Series) Finalized 
7/2/2008 (www.iilj.org), p. 23. 
87 IILJ Working Paper 2008/3 (History and Theory of International Law Series) Finalized 
7/2/2008 (www.iilj.org), p. 24. 
88 Ibid. 
89 IILJ Working Paper 2008/3 (History and Theory of International Law Series) Finalized 
7/2/2008 (www.iilj.org), p. 25. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
 23 
“chain of democratic legitimation”)92. Applying this in the arena of 
international law the believer in the unitarian model would suggest 
international institutions comprised of a parliament elected in accordance 
with an unbroken chain of democratic legitimation or, if possible, equip the 
institution with a referendum.93 Including other actors than those who can 
be traced back in the chain of democratic legitimation is not recommended 
in the unitarian model, since this would have a negative impact of the 
democratic legitimation of the decision.94 
 
The pluralist model on the other hand, objects to that last assertion of the 
unitarian model.95 The fundamental rights understanding of democracy, 
which often entails the pluralist model, emphasizes the need of civic 
participation, since the fundamental democratic principle to pluralists is 
transparency and involvement.96  
2.1.4 Universal jurisdiction 
Universal jurisdiction is a concept that has developed in international 
criminal law, which means that some offences are recognised as being of 
universal concern and therefore fall within the jurisdiction of every state, 
regardless of the nationality of who did it, the nationality of who the victim 
is and where the offence was committed.97 Generally speaking the offences 
that attract universal jurisdiction is genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes.98 In other words it is offences that could be labelled as the worst 
                                                
92 E. –W. Böckenförde, Mittelbare/repräsentative  Demokratie als eigentliche Form der 
Demokratie, in Festschrift für Kurt Eichenberg 301 et seq., 315 (G. Müller ed., 1982), as 
cited in IILJ Working Paper 2008/3 (History and Theory of International Law Series) 
Finalized 7/2/2008 (www.iilj.org), p. 25. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
95 IILJ Working Paper 2008/3 (History and Theory of International Law Series) Finalized 
7/2/2008 (www.iilj.org), p. 26. 
96 IILJ Working Paper 2008/3 (History and Theory of International Law Series) Finalized 
7/2/2008 (www.iilj.org), p. 26-27. 
97 Solidarity in a Disaggregated World – Universal Jurisdiction and the Evolution of 
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offences that exists and even with that in mind the concept of universal 
jurisdiction is still a debated issue.99  
 
Universal jurisdiction is interesting because as Carly Nyst puts it: 
“[u]niversal jurisdiction has persevered in the face of a norm that should 
dispense with it – state sovereignty”.100 Instead, Nyst argues, universal 
jurisdiction alters the definition of state sovereignty and that respect for 
human rights (and especially respect for international criminal justice) has 
become a constitutive element of international society.101 This line of 
thought is shared by Hallie Ludsin, who asserts that the government of a 
state: “[…] must fulfil duties necessary for abiding by the will of the people 
and acting in accordance with the common good”.102 If this requirement is 
not met, then the authority, i.e. the government of the state, loses some of its 
sovereignty and in effect legitimizes intervention in the state.103 Nyst’s and 
Ludsin’s ways of thinking are similar, since they define state sovereignty as 
something that is earned in the international society, rather than fixed 
condition on which states can justify their domestic behaviour.  
 
Another interesting aspect of Ludsin’s line of argument is how much 
sovereignty is to be considered as lost in relation to non-compliance or 
violation of human rights. Ludsin argues that “[…] governments have a duty 
to protect the human rights of their citizens”.104 Exactly what is meant to be 
covered by the term ‘human rights’ is a difficult question, not answered 
completely by Ludsin,105 although what is interesting for this thesis is that 
Ludsin does include some socio-economic rights into the definition.106 
Ludsin argues that, although socio-economic rights are much more debated 
than civil and political rights, some of the socio-economic rights are of such 
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fundamental value to human beings that in violating them the government of 
a state would lose some of its sovereignty.107 To get back to the point, the 
amount of sovereign rights lost in violation of human rights should be 
proportionate to the violation in question. So while socio-economic rights 
might in some cases be a less grave violation of human rights and thus not 
justify humanitarian intervention, Ludsin adds: 
 
“A representative government that violates its duties to the 
people on a much smaller scale retains sovereign authority in 
most areas and therefore most of its sovereign rights, but not the 
right to demand non-interference in relation to those specific 
violations [author’s emphasize].”108 
 
More on the impact on this contention will be discussed below in chapter 4. 
 
 
2.2 Two contemporary theories regarding 
Sovereignty 
This section will present two contemporary theories regarding sovereignty 
and its future definition and subsequently its preferred application. The 
impact of globalisation is the axis, on which modern theory of sovereignty 
spins around, which will be presented in the following. This is important to 
keep in mind because of the linkage between universal human rights and an 
ever-shrinking world, which is the focus of this thesis, in discussing 
justiciability and enforcement mechanisms of socio-economic human rights. 
The first section 2.2.1 will present the new sovereigntists, a school of 
thought I have labelled as radically particularist.109 Section 2.2.2 will offer a 
description of Anne Marie Slaughter’s thoughts on what she has named the 
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disaggregated state.110 Her theory is chosen by me since its contrasts that of 
the new sovereigntists, by being of a universalist nature. Although 
Slaughter’s proposition is not strictly cosmopolitan (and therefore not 
diametrically opposite the thoughts of the new sovereigntists), but it has 
received scholarly attention as a probable universalist theory and not been 
dismissed as utopian, which is why I prefer it too more hard-core 
universalist theories.111  
 
 
2.2.1 The new sovereigntists  
A group of American scholars has emerged as the new sovereigntists and 
their particularist definition of global order, with its fundaments in popular 
sovereignty as arguably the only democratically justifiable means of state-
governance, will be the first to take the stage in the small battle over 
sovereignty in this thesis.112 
 
2.2.1.1 Popular sovereignty as the guiding principle 
The new sovereigntists are radical in their safeguarding of popular 
sovereignty. The internationalized world of today and the global governance 
that entails it poses a problem to popular sovereignty since international 
law, with its disregard for constitutional principles, thrashes the chain of 
accountability and thus operates in a democratic deficit.113 In arguing this, 
they accede to the idea of popular sovereignty being the “dominant 
conception of democracy among political theorists and widely taken for 
granted by scholars as well as citizens”.114  
                                                
110 A new world order, Slaughter, Anne-Marie, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New 
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To spell it out even further, the new sovereigntists contend that international 
law emanating from sources other than constitutionally established national 
legislative organs undermines the popular sovereignty vested in the people 
of a certain sovereign state.115 In their most radical view, the very existence 
of international law, such as treaties and customary international law, does 
not even exist, since it is not emanating from a “legitimate coercive 
authority” elected by the popular sovereignty of a nation-state.116 The chain 
of accountability of international governmental organisations (IGOs), 
international courts and tribunals is too weak in the eyes of the new 
sovereigntists to be considered binding law.117  
 
The internationalized world poses a threat to the new sovereigntists since 
popular sovereignty, i.e. the power of the people to govern their own state, 
might be eradicated if globalization continues to vest power into 
intergovernmental and supranational institutions, without constitutional 
support and (by extension) popular support.118 Or as Goodhart and 
Bondanella Taninchev explains Jeremy Rabkin’s (a follower of the new 
sovereigntists school of thoughts)119 view on sovereignty: 
 
“[s]overeignty is first and foremost the means of saying no to 
outsiders; when governments can be intimidated into giving 
up sovereignty, individuals can be intimated into giving up 
rights.”120 
 
The new sovereigntists are, by definition, concerned with in-put 
legitimacy, that is they argue on the basis that globalisation and 
international law might very well be called for in the modern 
world, but the effects of global governance (i.e. international law) 
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still does not make it democratically legitimate.121 It is also 
interesting to note that the new sovereigntists think of globalisation 
and, by extension, global governance to be optional and since 
popular sovereignty might be severely damaged by globalisation, it 
should be avoided.122 This take on globalisation is not the only one 
that can be found. It has been argued that globalisation is an effect 
of American hegemony, or that capitalist interests drive it on, or to 
be more of a spontaneous matter without a subject in particular 
behind the steering wheel.123   
 
So, in line with what was discussed in section 2.1.4.3.1 above, the 
new sovereigntists particularist solution to global order, is to fall 
back on a concept that has been proven to work, namely democracy 
governed by popular sovereignty in a particular polity, which 
would be the nation-state. Only then is the interest of a nation-
state’s people safeguarded. 
 
2.2.2 The disaggregated state 
Anne-Marie Slaughter draws up a theory on modern international relations 
and seeks to redefine sovereignty with her concept of the disaggregated 
state.124 The core of Slaughter’s argument lies within her new conception of 
sovereignty, where the basic assumption that autonomy is the key ingredient 
of international relation between states, is pushed back by the assumption 
that sovereignty is really “the status and recognition to states in the 
international system to the extent that they are willing and able to engage 
with other states […]”.125  
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The concept of the disaggregation of the state is encouraging us to drop the 
notion of the unitary state, the state that presumably speaks in one voice, 
and instead apply the way we look at domestic governments when depicting 
a state in the international arena.126 Slaughter argues that unitary states is a 
simplification of the true nature of a state and that all the institutions, with 
their different areas of responsibilities, must be recognised as sovereign in 
their particular field.127  
 
When embracing sovereignty as the concept of willingness and ability to 
engage with other states, thus eradicating the unitary state, it opens up 
possibilities for, what Slaughter calls, horizontal and vertical government 
networks.128 The horizontal government networks would be one where 
counterpart national officials interact with each other in their specific areas 
of responsibility.129 Vertical government networks would be when a 
supranational institution exists and counterparts within that institution 
interact with their national peers.130 This is not strictly hypothetical in 
Slaughter’s view, many relations of the abovementioned sort already exits, 
but they are prevented from their full capabilities because of the principle of 
equal sovereignty and the notion of a unitary state.131  
 
I am going to focus on the juridical branch of the disaggregated state, since 
that is most relevant for this thesis, even though Slaughter’s theory covers 
other areas of international relations. The horizontal and vertical networks 
of judges over the world, in both national and supranational courts, are 
forming a global community of courts, in Slaughter’s view, rather than 
formal international legal system.132 The question of supranational courts 
and the delegating of actual sovereignty to them is actually dealt with 
caution. Slaughter openly admits that “vertical government networks should 
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be used sparingly” to avoid slipping down the slope towards a world 
government.133  However, as globalisation is a fact, Slaughter means that the 
need for establishing supranational institutions might arise.134 When that 
path is chosen, Slaughter maintains that sovereignty cannot be given away 
without state consent.135 
 
This is of course interesting, since Slaughter is trying to redefine 
sovereignty and in doing so arguing that autonomy is no longer a workable 
attribute of the concept, since the world has undergone changes. In 
Slaughter’s conclusion in A new world order, she even includes the remark: 
 
“If the background conditions for the international system are 
connection rather than separation, interaction rather than 
isolation, and institutions rather than free space, then 
sovereignty-as-autonomy makes no sense.”136 
 
So, in sum, Slaughter’s view on supranational institutions is somewhat 
ambiguous. The importance of supranational institutions are not 
downplayed, since such an institution can “pierce the shell of state 
sovereignty”137 and “harness the coercive power of national officials”138, in 
Slaughter’ view. But in the same time, Slaughter points out that the balance 
that need to be struck between supranational institutions must enable a state 
“to be able to more than hold its own”.139  Then the question seems to be 
how much piercing of the shell of sovereignty is to be desired. More on that 
issue will follow in section 4 below. 
 
So, in line with what was discussed in section 2.1.4.3.2 above, I find that the 
disaggregated state is a universalist theory belonging to the sub-category of 
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the pluralist school of thought. Slaughter is not as radical as to suggest a 
completely cosmopolitan world order, such as a democratic world 
federation. She maintains that the state should persist, although in a looser 
way than argued by particularists. However, it is difficult to compare the 
two strands of thoughts here (that is the new sovereigntists and the 
disaggregated state), since they are interested in different aspects of global 
governance and in particular its legitimacy. While, as mentioned before, the 
new sovereigntists are placing considerable weight in the importance of in-
put legitimacy, Slaughter as a universalist is more interested in out-put 
legitimacy. Followers of the particularist thought might very well agree that 
the disaggregated state and its conception on sovereignty could work for 
managing global problems. They would not agree however, that it is in 
compliance with normative ideals, conceptualized around popular 
sovereignty, which for them is what matters most.140  
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3 The right to health – a human 
right worthy of universal 
jurisdiction? 
3.1 The right to health 
This chapter will focus on the right to health, as laid down in article 12 of 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR). The Covenant is part of what is usually called the International 
Bill of Human Rights and has one hundred and sixty state parties, which in 
itself makes it suitable for examining the universality of the rights enshrined 
in the Covenant.141 When considering the preamble to the Covenant, it is 
clear that universal aspirations were a guiding principle of the agreements 
made, since the rights of the Covenant is said to “derive from the inherent 
dignity of the human person” and the express reference to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the reference to the “obligation of states 
under the Charter of the United Nations to promote universal respect for, 
and the observance of, human rights and freedoms […]”.142 The Covenant is 
clearly at least aiming for the universality of economic, social and cultural 
human rights. 
 
In the first section (3.1.1) of this chapter, I will give a brief overview on 
how the Covenant is set up to work. It will begin with looking closer at the 
right to health, both from the individual’s and the state’s perspective, as 
such and then proceed with examining what mechanisms are built into the 
Covenant in relation to justiciability and enforcement.  
 
                                                
141 For further information on the status of the treaty: 
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3.1.1 ICESCR – article 12 
3.1.1.1 Rights conveyed to the individual by article 12 
Firstly, it is important to be aware of that the right to health is considered a 
‘key human right’, which means that its realisation is important for the 
realisation of a lot of other fundamental human rights.143 Essentially, this 
means that if one is not entitled to one’s health, no other human rights 
matter; fundamental human rights are dependant on each other. 
 
The right to health includes more than just mere health care and by way of 
example General Comment No. 14 mentions, inter alia, adequate housing 
and access to clean drinking water to be included into the normative content 
of the right to health.144 The right to health is fleshed out by the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in its definition of its normative 
content, by applying the concepts of availability, accessibility, acceptability 
and quality.145  
 
The availability takes its aim on the quantity of health care related facilities 
and programmes, which must be sufficient to address the public demand.146 
Although the Council adheres to the fact that, depending on the available 
resources at hand in a specific state, this availability will vary.147 
Nonetheless, notwithstanding the developmental status of the state, there are 
minimum requirements that must be met: 
 
“[…] such as safe and potable drinking water and adequate 
sanitation facilities, hospitals, clinics and other health-related 
buildings, trained medical and professional personnel receiving 
domestically competitive salaries, and essential drugs, as 
defined by the WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs”. 
                                                
143Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), E/C.12/2000/4, 11 
August 2000, General Comment No. 14, para. 1 and 3. 
144 General Comment No. 14, para. 4. 
145 General Comment No. 14, para. 12. 
146 General Comment No. 14, para. 12 (a). 
147 Ibid. 
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The accessibility requires that the pursuit of the highest attainable standard 
of health is of a non-discriminatory nature, physically accessible, 
economically accessible and information on health issues is accessible as 
well.148  
 
The acceptability is concerned with medical ethics and understanding of 
cultural differences.149  
 
Lastly, the demand for quality, is rather straightforward, since the aid given 
at health care facilities of different kinds is to be “medically appropriate and 
of good quality”.150  
 
I will not elaborate further on the normative content of the right to health, 
although a lot more can be said on the subject. My goal here is simply to 
give an understanding of the relativity of the right to health being a socio-
economic right, governed by the principle laid down in ICESCR article 2, 
which will be presented in further detail in the next section. 
 
 
3.1.1.2 State obligations under article 12 
In ICESCR article 2 (1) the nature and scope of the state’s obligation under 
the Covenant is elaborated on, in relation to the rights enshrined therein. 
The provision requires of the state to: 
 
“[…] undertake to take steps, individually and through 
international assistance and co-operation, especially 
economic and technical, to the maximum of its available 
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant 
                                                
148 General Comment No. 14, para. 12 (b) i-iv. 
149 General Comment No. 14, para. 12 (c).  
150 General Comment No. 14, para. 12 (d). 
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by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption 
of legislative measures” [author’s emphasizing].151 
 
Since the world comprises of states in different stages of development, this 
obligation is relative in its nature, obligating states to systematically move 
forward to full realization of the rights in the Covenant.152 If a state should 
be found unwilling to take steps within the range of their available resources 
at disposal, the state would be in violation of the Covenant.153  If a violation 
of the Covenant should occur, domestic judicial remedies should be 
available, as well as remedies on an international level.154   
 
Interestingly enough, the Committee only extends incorporation of the 
Covenant into the domestic legal order, to a recommendation aimed at state 
parties of the Covenant.155 This is somewhat disappointing for me since 
incorporating it into national law seems like an effective measure, to help 
people’s awareness of their human rights. The Council also includes a 
remark on the aspiration that “judges and members of the legal profession 
should be encouraged by states to pay greater attention to violations of the 
right to health in the exercise of their functions” [author’s emphasizing].156 
In my view, this seems to be an unsatisfactory recommendation, when the 
optional protocol to the ICESCR demands for exhaustion of domestic 
remedies before declaring a case admissible.157 
 
3.1.1.3 Justiciability and enforcement mechanisms 
The justiciability of the human rights in the ICESCR is primarily 
centred on national legislation and national legal action, through the 
                                                
151 ICESCR article 2 (1). 
152 General Comment No. 14, para. 30-31.  
153 General Comment No. 14, para. 47. 
154 General Comment No. 14, para. 59. 
155 General Comment No. 14, para. 60. 
156 General Comment No. 14, para. 61. 
157 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, General Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/63/117, on 10 December, 2008, 
article 3 (1). 
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popular elected parliament and the judicial branch of the state.158 This is 
clearly expressed in ICESCR article 2.159 The problem with socio-
economic rights however, is the vagueness of the provisions in the 
ICESCR (as have been exemplified above with regard to the right to 
health); a vagueness which often persists in national legislation.160 The 
fact that socio-economic human rights are often vaguely regulated in 
international instruments, as well as in national legislation, leaves the 
individual trying to claim a certain right in a highly vulnerable situation. 
The low level of awareness of international human rights further 
reduces the justiciability of socio-economic human rights by national 
first instance administrative bodies.161 When the legislature admits that 
the task of providing for precise legislation in the field of international 
socio-economic rights is impossible, professionals working in the 
different fields connected to the socio-economic arena are left with 
interpreting the provisions on a case-by-case basis.162 This is a troubling 
situation, since it endangers both the democratic legitimacy of content 
of the socio-economic rights, when the task of interpreting the 
obligation in question is left to the administrative branch of the state, 
and the expected predictability of the outcome of a contested right.163 
 
Notwithstanding the problem with legislation regarding socio-economic 
human rights and the problems it causes for justiciability of the same, 
the ICESCR and the monitoring bodies connected to it, are responsible 
for overseeing the implementation of the Covenant and the structure of 
this process will be dealt with in the next section. 
 
                                                
158 Human Rights as Indivisible Rights: the protection of socio-economic demands under 
the European Convention on Human Rights, Koch, Ida Elisabeth, International Studies in 
Human rights, Vol. 101, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, Netherlands, 2009, p. 259-
260. 
159 Ibid. p. 260. 
160 Ibid. p. 260. 
161 Ibid. p. 262. 
162 Ibid. p. 261 and 263. 
163 Ibid. 260. 
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The reporting mechanism is regulated in ICESCR, part IV, articles 16-
23. When it comes to justiciability and enforcement, this is what can be 
found in the Covenant. A signatory state is expected to submit country 
reports “in accordance with a programme to be established by the 
Economic and Social Council […]”.164 This country report mechanism 
has a history of being to burdensome for states and actually not working 
very well.165 Since there are several others U.N. human right treaties, 
with their own country report mechanism, it has lead to a systemic 
collapse in some sense, where states are unable to provide for reports in 
time for all the monitoring bodies or actually stop reporting 
completely.166  
 
Nonetheless, ECOSOC is responsible to review the reports submitted 
by states and leave concluding observations on the reports,167 which are 
made public and submitted to the state in question.168 Obviously, these 
concluding observations are not binding legal decisions.169  
 
The Covenant has been added with an optional protocol, which enables 
individual communications and inter-state communications to be 
examined by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights.170 The Committee is a group of experts, put together to assist 
ECOSOC in their monitoring duties of the ICESCR.171 With regard to 
individual communications the Committee examines the question at 
hand, then provide its views on the communication and add 
recommendations if there are any and transmits this to the parties at 
                                                
164 ICESCR, article 17 (1). 
165 Out of the Abyss: the Challenges Confronting the New U.N. Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, Alston, Phillip, Human Rights Quarterly 9, 332-381, 1987, p. 
332-333. 
166 United Nations, General Assembly, A/57/387, 9 September, 2002, para. 53. 
167 ICESCR, article 16 (2) (a). 
168 Excerpt from the Report on the Forty-Fourth and Forty-Fifth Sessions (E/2011/22 – 
E/C.12/2010/3), paras. 19-59, para. 30-32, available at: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/workingmethods.htm, 2013-07-18, 10:47. 
169 Treaty Bodies and the Interpretation of Human Rights, Mechlem, Kerstin, Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law, Volume 42:905, 2009, p. 905-906. 
170 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, articles 1, 2 and 10. 
171 Alston, Phillip, p. 332. 
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hand.172 Inter-state communications are either solved through a friendly 
settlement, which the committee then describes shortly in a brief 
statement of the matter.173 Or, if such a friendly settlement is not 
reached, a complete statement of the matter is accounted for by the 
Committee and any views that the Committee might have is attached to 
the statement.174 As with the country report mechanism, the 
Committee’s statements in relation to individual and inter-state 
communications are not considered to be legally binding decisions.175 
 
                                                
172 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, article 9. 
173 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, article 10 (1) (h) (i). 
174 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, article 10 (1) (h) (ii). 
175 Mechlem, Kerstin, p. 905-906. 
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4 Analysis 
4.1 Pinpointing ICESCR’s treaty bodies on 
the map of international law 
Up to this point, the aim of the inquiry made, has been to paint a 
comprehensive picture of the debate on sovereignty. A plunge into the 
history of the concept has been accounted for, as well as modern thinking on 
the subject to some extent, focused on universal jurisdiction and the 
particularist thinkers embodied in the new sovereigntists and the universal 
line of thought framed into the concept of the disaggregated state. It is time 
to tie it all together by applying the theoretical instruments together with 
ICESCR article 12, the right to health, to pinpoint the legal framework of 
the ICESCR on the map of international law. Let us see what theories on 
sovereignty tell us about ICESCR’s current status in relation to the principle 
of equal sovereignty and glimpse at the impact the same theories might have 
on the future of the ICESCR. 
 
4.1.1 ICESCR – universalist or particularist? 
It is difficult to argue that the ICESCR is not an agreement between states 
governed by the idea of the existence of universal human rights. The mere 
number of state parties to the convention signals that the content of the 
Covenant is something that most states willingly admit to be of great 
importance for the dignity of human kind. The preamble to the Covenant 
also speaks the language of universality.  
 
When examining the human rights catalogue in part III of the Covenant, the 
feeling of true universality of the Covenant is upheld. The only indication of 
a glitch in the universal aspirations of the Covenant is found in article 2, 
where the progressive nature of the realisation of socio-economic rights is 
acknowledged. However, this provision does not necessarily mean that the 
universality of the rights enshrined in the Covenant is watered down. The 
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Covenant obviously needs to be anchored to reality and be honest of the fact 
that states worldwide are in different developmental stages. The provision 
opens up for the possibility for the legal framework of the ICESCR to 
develop through the work of ECOSOC and the Committee of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights.  
 
Turning to the optional protocol to the ICESCR the situation somewhat 
changes. Starting with the fact that an optional protocol is needed to be 
signed and ratified in order for states to give their consent to recognise the 
competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications. This 
model of treaty making adheres to the classic interpretation of state 
sovereignty, where the international community only is permitted to 
intervene in domestic affairs after the state in question has given its consent. 
Even after consent has been given through becoming a party to the optional 
protocol, the Committee is not granted with any real power. The decisions 
that can be taken under the auspices of the Committee are not considered 
binding, but merely soft law at its best. This is striking me as a particularist 
pattern, where the particular polity is still considered to be the one sphere 
where legal decisions are acknowledged as binding. The individual states 
parties to the Covenant are not ready to vest power, delegate a piece of their 
own sovereignty, to the international community, in this case the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
 
So, when the Covenant and the optional protocol are viewed together it is 
showing signs of both universalism and particularism. This discovery is of 
course not very surprising, since the world is seemingly divided between 
universalist and particularist thought. An international agreement trying to 
abridge this inconvenience is bound to end up in a compromise between the 
two schools of thought. 
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4.1.2 Individual communications in clash with 
sovereignty 
The willingness of states to be able to fulfil their human rights obligations in 
relation to their citizens seems to be provided for. The ICESCR is widely 
accepted as inherent dignities of the human kind and it seems safe to 
contend that no state, considering themselves as democratic and a part of the 
international community, would openly argue that the rights in ICESCR are 
too far reaching. The way to get there, applying the Covenant in a correct 
way, is really the question that has yet to be answered satisfyingly. This is 
the main task of the ECOSOC and the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights.  
 
In issuing general comments and raising questions of relevance for the 
ICESCR in other organs of the UN concerned with the Covenant and taking 
up individual communications and inter-state communications, delivering 
decisions in the matters, the ECOSOC and the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights see to that the knowledge of the application of 
the Covenant is maturing. Since the Covenant is a treaty drafted on the 
principle of relativity and progressive realisation of the rights therein, these 
tasks of the monitoring bodies of the Covenant are of crucial importance. In 
order to release the full power of the Covenant the practice of the 
application needs to be constantly tested and scrutinized, in relation to 
specific cases of specific states. This would effectively crystallize the 
understanding of the relativity of socio-economic rights. If the monitoring 
bodies of the Covenant deepened the knowledge of the application of the 
Covenant, the justiciability and enforcement on a national level would be 
strengthened. The encouragement called on in General Comment No. 14, for 
judges and members of the legal profession to pay greater attention to 
violations of the Covenant, is a duty that first and foremost lies with the 
monitoring bodies of the ICESCR themselves.  
 
The way the Covenant and the optional protocol is understood to be 
functioning right now is however not making this task easy on the 
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monitoring bodies of ICESCR. In order to monitor effectively states must 
give consent beforehand. To this date, ten states are parties to the optional 
protocol, which is of course quite a big difference in comparison to the 
Covenant itself.176 The possibility of the monitoring bodies to receive 
communications is obviously rather scarce and they are forced to remain 
fleshing out the understanding of the ICESCR on a general level. Clarifying 
an already generally held treaty, in general recommendations are not the 
cure that is needed in order to truly make the economic, social and cultural 
rights justiciable and enforceable. But since granting admissibility to 
individual communications without prior state consent, is considered to be 
violating the principle of equal sovereignty, as it is applied today in relation 
to ICESCR, the monitoring bodies are tied with their hands behind their 
back. 
 
4.1.3 Justiciability intervention 
Previously in this thesis, the debate whether reaction by the international 
community to a specific state’s neglect of respect for socio-economic rights 
might be justified, as long as the reaction is proportionate to the violation at 
hand, has been accounted for. In other words, the question is whether it 
might be legally justified to intervene in domestic affairs, by for example 
overseeing the fact that the state in question has not ratified the optional 
protocol and the committee in spite of this grants an individual 
communication admissibility? 
 
Yes, I think that one might argue in that direction. This is what Ludsin 
argues and she includes socio-economic rights and in particular mentions 
the right to health.177 When a state is in violation of the right to health, the 
state in question would lose its sovereign rights in relation to that particular 
field and the international community has the right to intervene to protect 
the interest of the individuals of that state. Now, Ludsin does not expand on 
                                                
176 http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3-
a&chapter=4&lang=en, 2013-07-21, 14:22. 
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the intervention as such, more than that it needs to be proportionate in 
relation to the violation. I will try to put forward a concrete suggestion as to 
what could be done in such a case, where the right to health is violated by a 
state. 
 
It has been argued that, in relation to international criminal law and human 
rights of that field, respect for human rights is constitutive of the modern 
interpretation of sovereignty. Without respect for basic human rights, there 
can be no true sovereignty by elected officials, since the rights of the true 
sovereigns, the people, is violated. This interpretation serves to justify the 
doctrine of universal jurisdiction, in relation to international crimes and – 
although still debated – it persists in the international community. Taking 
Ludsin’s argumentation in consideration, I would like to suggest that the 
concept of universal jurisdiction could arguably be expanded to justify 
intervention in matters relating to socio-economic rights, such as the right to 
health. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights should 
have universal jurisdiction to grant admissibility to possible violations of the 
ICESCR.178 The reason for this will be expanded on in the next section. 
 
States parties to the ICESCR have acknowledged the existence of economic, 
social and cultural rights of all human kind in their ratification of the 
Covenant. However, the way forward, how to progressively achieve these 
obligations, are not included into the acknowledgement of the existence of 
the rights in the actual Covenant, since this is a much more complicated 
issue. The monitoring bodies and the optional protocol were set up to see to 
the Covenant’s effective implementation, but at the same time their power 
to do so were harnessed by the principle of equal sovereignty. But if respect 
for socio-economic human rights is argued to be constitutive of sovereign 
power, the sovereignty enabling a state to give consent for intervention in 
that matter would be lost if a violation has occurred or is at risk of 
occurring. To put it differently, picture yourself the following: the right to 
                                                
178 The jurisdiction will not extend to the whole of the world, since I only argue that state 
parties to the ICESCR should be considered within the jurisdiction of the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
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health is at risk of being violated in a state, which is a party to the ICESCR, 
and this possible violation is brought to the Committee’s attention through 
an individual communication. The state in question is not a party to the 
optional protocol, which by adhering to the classical definition of 
sovereignty, would prevent the Committee from declaring the 
communication admissible. However, applying modern theories of 
sovereignty, where respect for human rights is constitutive for the 
authority’s claim to sovereignty the interpretation of the optional protocol 
would be differently. The true sovereign is of course the people of the state 
and the government decisions are only considered legitimate when in 
conformity of the people’s will. If the inherent dignities of human kind are 
at risk of being violated, the government then loses its sovereign rights in 
relation to the right to health (i.e. in relation to this specific human right). As 
Ludsin argues, the government might very well be suited to still be 
considered sovereign for the most part. As long as the government is in 
compliance with all others human right obligations, it keeps its sovereign 
position in relation to those obligations. But, in relation to the right to health 
the international community should have the right to intervene in a 
proportionate manner. My suggestion for such a proportionate intervention, 
would be what I call the ‘justiciability intervention’. In other words the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, is granted the right to 
declare individual communications admissible, even if it originate from a 
state not party to the optional protocol.  
 
So, in this fictitious case above the optional protocol to ICESCR is actually 
superfluous and the state would not have the authority to give consent in the 
matter. This would lead to the conclusion that the Committee for Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights should have a justified right to intervene. The 
monitoring bodies should have a right to a proportionate intervention in the 
domestic affairs and admissibility of a possible violation of the covenant. 
This could only result in a decision of a non-binding nature, so even if the 
Committee decision would fall in favour of the state, the intervention should 
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be considered as proportionate in my view, because of its rather non-
invasive nature. 
 
If the outcome only would be a decision that the state could choose not to 
adhere to, what would the use of this ‘justiciability intervention’ be? As 
explained above, the relativity of the progressive realisation of the ICESCR 
needs to be clarified on a much more specific basis than through general 
comments. If the monitoring bodies could examine possible violations in 
states that has not given consent, this would enable the understanding of 
rights in the Covenant to be pinpointed to different developmental stages of 
states, different political situations, expanded to a variety of alternatives for 
implementation tailor made for different cultures, but still in relation to a 
global treaty. 
 
This would also help national jurisdictions to pay attention to the ICESCR 
in their respective domestic jurisdictions, which have considerably more 
tools to use in relation to enforcement of juridical decisions, than an 
international monitoring body. Together the monitoring bodies and the 
national courts could “nationalize” the rights in the covenant, giving it the 
relativity asked for in ICESCR article 2. Viewing the interaction between 
the international monitoring bodies and national courts in this way, would 
be an effective example of the vertical networks, described in Slaughter’s 
theory on the disaggregated state. And states of similar political structures 
and developmental stages could engage in horizontal networks, further 
driving the understanding of economic, social and cultural rights of the 
ICESCR forward. As discussed above in section 3.1.1.3, the vagueness of 
socio-economic rights has resulted in a situation where no one takes full 
responsibility for the interpretation of the ICESCR. The Covenant itself is 
vaguely formulated, delegating the task to national legislatures, which in 
their turn implement imprecise international legal norms into national 
legislation in an equally imprecise manner. The monitoring bodies can only 
monitor the implementation through a malfunctioning country-reporting 
system and through a communications made admissible through an optional 
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protocol ratified by only ten states. If applying a modern take on sovereign 
theory and admitting the respect for socio-economic human rights as 
constitutive of sovereign authority, the international community could 
arguably have an obligation to admit to its responsibility for effectively 
monitoring the implementation of a system that does not work properly. If 
socio-economic human rights are in the risk of being violated and 
individuals are not given a proper chance of national justiciability, because 
of vague legislation, which is impenetrable because of the low level of 
knowledge of international human rights obligations in national 
administrative bodies, then the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights should have the possibility of granting admissibility to 
communications without prior state consent. This to effectively create 
vertical governmental networks and break the stalemate of the 
implementation of the ICESCR. With a greater amount of cases dealt with 
by the monitoring bodies, greater understanding of the content of socio-
economic rights is achieved. The process of understanding the ICESCR 
must be jump-started somewhere in the process, in which everybody falls 
back on the same excuse; namely the difficulty of knowing what obligations 
are created by socio-economic human rights in specific situations. 
 
So, in relation to for example the right to health, the juridical branches of 
states could – with a greater mass of international ‘soft case law’ to pinpoint 
their actions to – effectively work on deciding what is minimum 
requirements of the economic accessibility of health care, or what is to be 
understood as good practice of medical ethics in relation to cultural 
differences, or if a national health policy plan is in compliance with the 
demands on the maximum availability of resources and progressive 
realisation in relation to a specific state. 
 
To conclude, the monitoring bodies of the ICESCR could stop waiting on 
delayed country reports and more ratifying states of the optional protocol 
and start monitoring to show the people of the world that the Covenant is 
alive. States would probably object to the liberties taken by the monitoring 
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bodies, but let us be honest: all sovereignty was once taken on more or less 
violent terms by states we now consider legitimate. Maybe it is time for the 
international community to do the same. 
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